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TThe costs of social security services are traditionally charged to the wage of active workers in the form of a general wage-proportionate contribution. The philosophy of this solution somewhat varies between the 
two large social security sub-systems, namely 
healthcare and pension.
The philosophy behind The financing 
of social securiTy sub-sysTems
in the case of healthcare financing, there are 
two underlying principles behind the way in 
which costs are passed on to active workers on 
a wage-proportionate basis.
uthe solidarity principle: instead of all 
beneficiaries paying a contribution in pro-
portion to their average wage all their lives 
(a ‘head tax’, as it were, which more or less 
corresponds to the principle of equal pay for 
equal service), load-bearing capacity is also 
taken into account and higher earners in part 
finance the services provided to lower-income 
workers.
vthe principle of smoothing financing 
over a person’s lifetime: workers pay contribu-
tions during their active career only, which are 
evenly distributed over this period but almost 
never correspond to actual use. At a younger 
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age, we pay considerably more than we cur-
rently consume (on average, of course), while 
in old age this is the exact opposite, but in 
theory, on average, the contributions paid and 
the expected values of the service received are 
in balance for the entire life-cycle. (As a minor 
adjustment, it should be noted that the solu-
tion as per the first principle – that is, current 
wage-proportionate financing – in part serves 
the realisation of the second principle if we 
assume that our income gradually increases 
during our life-cycle).
As wages are highly dispersed, it would 
not be exaggerated to assert that healthcare is 
largely financed from the contribution parts 
collected based on the solidarity principle.
in comparison to this, the financing phi-
losophy of the most important sub-system of 
the pension system in Hungary (and in most 
places around the world) [typically called pil-
lar i as used by the World Bank – see World 
Bank (1994)] is somewhat different, or at 
least its focal points lie elsewhere. Accord-
ing to this, in our active age we waive part of 
our wages for the benefit of the elderly and in 
exchange, when we ourselves become elderly, 
the proportion of annuity we receive from 
the total annuities offered by the active work-
ers at the time to the elderly is equal to the 
ratio of our earlier contributions to the total 
contributions paid [‘social contract between 
generations’, Samuelson (1958)]. Of the two 
principles described above, this fundamen-
tally corresponds to the second principle – 
the smoothing of financing over the life-cycle 
– although solidaristic elements are at times 
also included – to a smaller extent – in the 
pension system.
The philosophy outlined above is rendered 
somewhat more complicated by the fact that 
contributions are usually formally broken 
down into contribution parts that are charged 
– directly and indirectly – on worker wages. 
The latter is formally paid by the employer for 
the wage provided, and is not included in the 
gross wage of the worker. At the same time, 
from a very general perspective, we can assume 
that this distribution is arbitrary, and that all 
contributions count regardless of whether 
paid in full by the worker or the employer.
We should also mention that it may be 
possible – indeed, it happens increasingly fre-
quently – that during the financing of either 
healthcare or the pension system, the second 
principle is not met for a given generation in 
the sense that the total of contributions paid 
(valorised) by the given generation and the an-
nuities (healthcare benefits) received are un-
equal. The deficit or surplus is financed or re-
ceived by other generations. According to the 
initial philosophy, this is not a problem, and is 
usually disregarded, but at the same time this 
is where the roots of today’s problems lie.
The crisis of social securiTy 
financing
today’s financing model of social security, 
as briefly outlined above, is in crisis in most 
countries where it is in place. The main cause of 
this crisis is that, back in the day, these models 
were based on unclear or flawed principles 
(this particular type of ‘social contract between 
generations’ is fundamentally questionable), 
or they were based on external circumstances 
existing – but explicitly disregarded – at the 
set-up. One of the most important external 
circumstances is the fact that population is 
on the rise; there are always enough younger 
active workers to take care of the rising – but 
proportionately still limited – number of 
the elderly, and to also pay their healthcare 
services. This implicit assumption is deeply 
integrated into the financing model, with no 
troubles observed as long as the number of 
active workers dynamically increased. today, 
however, the situation has changed and this has 
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been the case for some time, with no specific 
hope of restoring the conditions existing at the 
time of the establishment of the system, which 
means that something needs to be done. One 
possibility is to rethink the philosophy of 
financing, while another is to manage (using 
ad-hoc solutions) a sub-problem from a large 
pile of problems that seems most urgent at any 
given time or which has been pointed out by 
someone for some particular reason. i believe 
that the article under review is taking the 
latter route, while in my opinion the former 
should be the way to go.
on The sTudy by mÁdi and Árva
The inspiration for my train of thought was 
an article by Mádi and Árva published on the 
pages of this publication last year [Mádi – Árva 
(2016), online: http://www.penzugyiszemle.
hu/penzugyi-szemle-folyoirat-aktualis-szam/a-
tarsadalombiztositas-finanszirozasi-reformja], 
which proposed the solution the authors called 
‘fiscalisation’ as the main direction for the re-
form of social security (including the pension 
and healthcare systems). By this they mean that 
we should abandon the financing of these social 
security sub-systems through contributions 
added to wages as this makes labour more 
expensive and hence, keeps employment low. 
instead, they propose to resolve the financing 
from general tax revenues. in analysing the 
study we find that it addresses numerous issues 
and topics; but it is also informative to see what 
was omitted. i wish to highlight two omissions 
that i consider to be highly important.
The authors fail to discuss the philosophy 
of social security financing – the opening sub-
ject of this paper.
They completely overlook what the desir-
able level of pension and healthcare is – some-
thing which of course is closely linked to the 
previous topic.
Although the authors do not explain how 
fiscalised social security would be different 
from today’s social security, they most likely 
assume that it would not differ in any other 
respects. They argue that the form of financ-
ing is highly influenced by the service struc-
ture and level of social security and by the 
circle of the beneficiaries. Let us start with the 
level of care.
Why is it important to determine  
the level of  care?
Both the level of pensions and healthcare – 
in today’s Hungary, but in reality in any such 
state-maintained systems – could be entirely 
different from what we can observe today. 
When the question is raised what justifies 
the current level of pensions, the answer is 
more or less that this is what the contribution 
level permits or, from another side, by 
paying a particular level of contributions 
the beneficiary earned this particular level 
of pension. This stems from the fact that 
according to the above outlined philosophy of 
the pension system, contribution has a dual 
nature [see Borló’s (2016) strong emphasis 
on the matter]: it currently finances pensions 
and at the same time it also creates eligibility. 
Based on this philosophy, in theory it can 
be objectively determined whether pensions 
are low or high (subjectively, pensions are 
obviously low as we frequently hear). Looking 
at the level of healthcare, our task is more 
difficult as this philosophy does not provide 
such a good point of reference as in the case 
of pension. This is because while the solidarity 
component is secondary for pension, it has a 
crucial significance in the financing philosophy 
of healthcare. in other words, this could also 
mean a wholly different service level.
Focusing solely on the source of financing, 
the authors fail to clarify what level of pen-
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sion or healthcare would be financed down 
the line through reformed, ‘fiscalised’ financ-
ing. in reality, (international) practice has 
long decided this matter and the solution is 
also very logical: fiscalised pension financing 
can mean nothing other but a uniform, low-
rate basic state pension available to all citizens 
after a certain age. it is no coincidence that 
the concept of direct budgetary financing was 
introduced by Augusztinovics, as quoted by the 
authors, in relation to the basic pension. The 
authors perceive but fail to recognise its signif-
icance, simply adding as a final note that they 
do not wish to delve deeper into the matter of 
the basic pension.
Why is it logical that (‘fiscalised’) pension 
financed from a general budgetary source must 
be uniform, low-amount and made available 
to all citizens (pension that can be character-
ised by these features together is called, after 
all, basic pension)? if this is financed from 
general taxes, there are no criteria to exclude 
anyone, in other words, all citizens must be 
eligible. Compared to the situation today, this 
would require the considerable expansion of 
the number of eligible persons, as today peo-
ple not paying contributions or those not 
paying contributions for an adequately long 
period are excluded from pension. However, 
everyone pays some form of taxes, if nothing 
else then the value-added tax on boxed wine. 
As a result, in the case of fiscalised pension, 
there would be no criteria that would allow 
for the differentiation of pensions. The basis 
of differentiation could, of course, be the level 
of personal income tax, but if – as the authors 
also propose – pensions were to be financed 
from carbon-tax, then how much pit a given 
person pays loses relevance. pension differen-
tiated as per the above would not survive a 
political fight on the matter, making the uni-
form pension level the only logically stable 
solution – as aptly demonstrated by interna-
tional practice.
However, there are two reasons why the 
uniform pension level should not be high. 
Firstly, the budget would not be able to sup-
ply for a high-level uniform pension, and sec-
ondly, it would be easy to torpedo the notion 
that a broad range of citizens receive higher 
pensions from public funds than their active-
age income. Another addendum: in the case 
of a fiscalised pension system, we might as 
well wave good-bye to other flexibility solu-
tions such as varied retirement ages (although 
this idea – early retirement at least – should be 
eliminated in all other state-financed pension 
systems as well).
We can conclude that setting the fiscalisa-
tion of the pension system as an objective is 
actually – albeit implicitly – identical to the 
transition to basic pension, or more accurately 
to an arrangement (frequently encountered in 
Anglo-saxon countries) where state pension 
exclusively means basic pension.
Of course, the Anglo-saxon model – where 
the state only provides the basic pension and 
the part above this pension is partly paid by 
the employer and is partly provided by the 
worker’s retirement plan – is a viable and 
good pension model and transitioning to this 
scheme should be taken into consideration. 
its main benefit is that it requires a much 
lower amount of public funds in proportion 
to Gdp than the existing ‘work pension sys-
tem’, and that it involves a much lower share 
of Gdp in the state pension system. But the 
adoption of this scheme is a problematic and 
lengthy process and, for political considera-
tions, it might be more expedient to begin 
the transition with fiscalisation. (This is cer-
tainly not the case professionally, but pension 
is less of a professional and more of a political 
matter).
The situation is somewhat different with 
the state financing of healthcare, and the rea-
son for this is the abovementioned difference 
in philosophy. if a large part of the contribu-
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tion already has a solidarity function, then 
the contribution paid by the individual and 
the level of healthcare received have no sig-
nificant relation to one another in the first 
place. As a result, in theory, the financing of 
healthcare could easily be resolved in some 
other form. in this regard, i certainly agree 
with the authors’ proposition that fiscalisation 
should start with healthcare. i feel that the fi-
nancing of healthcare through contributions 
is less substantiated ‘philosophically’ than in 
the case of the pension system; indeed, there 
is far more room for making changes in this 
area – even in the form of an NHs-style fis-
calisation. At the same time, it should also be 
mentioned that the fiscalisation of the financ-
ing of healthcare in practice would mean the 
extension of care to social segments that cur-
rently do not pay contributions. in the case of 
healthcare financed from general taxes – as is 
the case with the basic pension – there are no 
criteria whatsoever for excluding anyone from 
the services.
Looking back, the fact that – despite the 
difference in financing philosophy – health-
care is financed from wage-proportionate 
contributions, is likely the result of a one-
time analogy deduced from pension financ-
ing, which the one-time joint institutional 
control demanded and made rational. At the 
same time, of the services provided by health-
care, ‘household’ care – in other words, what 
the various individuals receive in money, the 
rate of which, in turn, also depends on their 
wage – such as sick pay or disability annu-
ity, is closely linked to wages. For this reason, 
the financing of the various sub-systems of 
healthcare along the lines of a different logic, 
in other words wage-proportionate contribu-
tion – with a much smaller range than today 
– could be justifiable. in the case of the larger 
part – primarily institution financing –, wage-
proportionate contribution is not self-explan-
atory at all.
Why is the philosophy important?
We have already touched on the issue of 
philosophy in relation to the level of care, but 
now let us take a step back and assume that we 
do introduce a pension system such as the one 
suggested (but not actually discussed in detail) 
by the authors. According to this, pension 
remains differentiated, with levels similar to 
those today, but financing is performed using 
wholly different budgetary resources and not 
from wage-proportionate charges.
There is one thing that is certain in relation 
to such a system: it will not be permanent 
and will certainly not reproduce itself. As in 
this case the level of care will clearly be deter-
mined arbitrarily – compared to the financing 
source –, it will be exposed to two different 
types of political pressure: the groups that re-
ceive pensions lower than others will ‘prove’ 
that they are due at least as much as those in 
more favourable positions. And they will ac-
complish this as care levels have been deter-
mined arbitrarily, and why should not these 
arbitrary levels be arbitrary in some other 
fashion. Fiscal government will always strive 
to push down the level of pensions since they 
represent an increasingly growing direct bur-
den on the budget. As a result, both the care 
level and the differentiation will change hecti-
cally, subject to political cycles, without any 
brakes or guarantees built into the system. 
Consequently, participants will certainly be 
even more unhappy with it than today, feel-
ing even less in control over their pensions – 
apart from ‘voicing’ their demands – and they 
will recognise pension as their own even less 
so than today.
subjectively, fiscalisation – in other words 
the ‘large basket’ – communicates to individ-
uals that their pension has no objective rate, 
i.e. there is nothing protecting it and it could 
decrease at any given moment. This is why 
deserting is a reasonable individual strategy; 
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there is no point, after all, in participating in 
such a system.
it is no coincidence that this proposal was 
drawn up by macro-economists based solely 
on a macro-perspective; indeed, such tunnel 
vision is fairly characteristic among these ex-
perts. to give an example: it was macro-econ-
omist Mária Augusztinovics – an otherwise 
outstanding economist much quoted by the 
authors – who has asserted (Augusztinovics, 
2005) that there is nothing wrong with the 
Hungarian pension system from a macro-
perspective because, even though the number 
of the elderly has grown (and continues to 
grow), the number of births fell sharply si-
multaneously, which means that active work-
ers now provide for roughly the same number 
of inactive people as before. it is obviously of 
secondary importance that we give a consid-
erable portion of our income to our children 
voluntarily but when it comes to giving to the 
elderly, the state, as it were, has to ‘rip it out 
of our hands’.
The fact that the authors do not concern 
themselves with the philosophy of pension 
financing but treat it as a purely technical is-
sue, renders their ‘list of reforms’ extremely 
formal, no more than a technical list of pos-
sible tasks. in reality, however, these potential 
sub-steps cannot be randomly attached to one 
another; a philosophy is needed that would le-
gitimise the system so it may be more or less 
maintained across election cycles, providing a 
measure of guarantee to stakeholders, allow-
ing them to believe in it rather than toying 
with the idea of deserting.
The concept of fiscalisation as presented by 
the authors (which i consider problematic pri-
marily in respect of the pension system) is vul-
nerable to criticism even on the basis of their 
own logic. Firstly, fiscalisation does not mean 
savings – even though it was put forward as 
such – but rather added expenditures and less 
revenues. it means less revenues because they 
relinquished contributions, and more expen-
ditures because they have given up on the pos-
sibility of setting any entry conditions to pen-
sion or healthcare.
in addition, if something is built on a tax 
that is unconnected to it, then it cannot be 
anything but a short-term solution as in the 
long run, the financing source would have to 
be changed continuously. For instance – to 
use the authors’ example –, carbon tax is un-
suitable to finance pension as it is meant to 
incentivise stakeholders to lower omissions; 
in other words, it is likely to terminate itself 
(along with pollution), which is the very ob-
jective for which it was created. The financ-
ing of pensions, however, is a permanent and 
long-term problem. in addition, factors such 
as the carbon tax should be spent on the things 
against which they are being collected – i.e. to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions –, something 
that political voices will certainly be demand-
ing sooner or later down the line.
fiscalisaTion, or someThing else 
perhaps? – a possible alTernaTive
Based on the above, in my opinion fiscalisation 
in respect of financing healthcare is a direction 
that merits consideration. it is no coincidence 
that the authors first reassessed this particular 
topic in respect of healthcare (Árva – Giday 
– Mádi, 2017). There are issues worth 
reconsidering even in this area: one being that 
the prime example of fiscalised healthcare, 
the NHs in the united Kingdom, is facing 
increasing challenges and is becoming more 
and more difficult to be viewed as an 
example to follow. Another issue, as has been 
mentioned above, is that fiscalised healthcare 
would indeed eliminate a part of the wage 
contribution in the first-round, but instead 
of cutting expenditures, this would lead to an 
increase through the expansion of eligibility. 
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At the same time, it is a ‘philosophical’ 
argument for the fiscalisation of healthcare – 
and the authors are right in this respect – that 
in Hungary the role of the budget in healthcare 
financing is substantial already. As a result, it 
does not function as a purely financial sub-
system even today; that is, it fails to adhere 
to its own operating philosophy, opening the 
door – even ‘philosophically’ – to fiscalisation. 
discussing this topic, therefore, is wholly 
justified and has been expected for some time.
i, however, feel that this direction should 
not be followed in the case of the pension sys-
tem (which is why i have highlighted the word 
‘pension’ in the title of my study), as partial 
fiscalisation (namely, that wage contribution 
is not the basis for all pension expenditures) 
is causing problems in this regard already. The 
fact that the pension system does not insist on 
its own financing philosophy sends the mes-
sage to stakeholders to increase their pension 
demand as it does not depend on their own 
contributions. This means that the system 
miscalculates –overshoots – the consumption 
point of reference of pensioners. Admittedly, 
however, it is difficult for the pension system 
to adhere to its own philosophy – as estab-
lished by samuelson – as it is fundamentally 
flawed in the first place [the detailed discus-
sion of this point is beyond the scope of this 
study – see Banyár (2014)].
The authors introduce the topic by stating 
that contributions are too high. At the same 
time, we are aware that it is not contributions 
that are too high in general, but rather the 
general budgetary charges. This problem can-
not be resolved by picking out a single item, 
and re-labelling it. should this happen, an-
other item will come under attack, invariably, 
the one where positions are deemed to be the 
weakest.
Of course, there may be partial truths in 
the restructuring of burdens, but this needs a 
philosophy – and some are available already – 
for instance, the fiscalisation of the lion’s share 
of healthcare is justifiable, while that of pen-
sion, not really.
At the same time, fiscalisation should be 
treated with caution; indeed, i would take the 
opposite direction: a separate financing source 
should be identified for each major budget-
ary objective, one that reflects the philosophy 
thereof. For my part, i would prefer to plan 
the specific charges based on the budget item 
to be financed. i would prefer to do this de-
spite being aware that ‘labelling’ and ‘earmark-
ing’ are traditionally subject to fierce criticism 
among Hungarian macro-economists. Along 
the lines of this principle, we may find that the 
financing of pension serves as a good example 
already, as wage-based charges are perfectly 
justified and correct, given that pension is 
similar to wage itself, and was subject to being 
kept on payroll after retirement. We might as 
well see this as the income distribution of the 
life-cycle during the life-cycle. The problem is 
that it is not because of the high contribution 
charges that Hungary is not competitive; con-
tributions are high because of the ageing of 
the population and because we will not allow 
the elderly to starve to death. This cannot be 
changed through fiscalisation and any attempt 
to do this would be nothing more than sleight 
of hand. This pension system needs substan-
tial changes.
However, i do agree with the authors that 
there is much room for improvement in the fi-
nancing of the pension system. The challenge 
is to find a completely different philosophy to 
replace the current flawed solution, one that 
would restructure burdens and ensure the 
long-term legitimacy and sustainability of the 
system. The authors positively quote the Bo-
tos couple’s pension concept that is linked to 
the number of children; indeed, this solution 
would help increase the number of children 
which in turn would assist in resolving the is-
sue of pension financing.
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On my part, i think that the new pension 
philosophy should be based on the reproduc-
tion of contribution payers, and that numer-
ous sub-elements of a sustainable pension 
system are consistent with the Botos’s con-
ception. At the same time, i find their phi-
losophy – namely, that the pension system 
should be used to encourage childbirth – to 
be flawed. instead, i would retrace the pen-
sion system to the need of settlement between 
generations, i.e. young people provide pen-
sions for their parents’ generation by repaying 
the costs of their rearing (or more precisely, 
only for those who actively participated in 
rearing them), but get nothing in return; they 
are merely repaying the debt they have ac-
cumulated during their active years. if they 
wish to receive pension, they can do one of 
two things: invest some of their income into 
the production of contribution-payers (in 
other words, rear children) or accumulate 
income for future consumption, or perhaps 
combine the two. such a pension system flex-
ibly adapts to social preferences: if the num-
ber of children is low, the state pension will 
also be low but sufficient for those who have 
raised children. Meanwhile, those who opt 
for not having children will have to rely on 
their own savings, as society has nothing to 
‘give back’ to them as pension, and the con-
tributions they paid in their active age were 
merely repayment for the debts ‘they owed’ 
for their rearing. This system, this philosophy 
answers why pension is as much as it is, and 
why the people receiving it actually receive 
it. There are of course many details to clarify, 
but these can be easily addressed based on the 
well-established fundamental premises. such 
a system is likely to provide a much better in-
centive for having children – compared to the 
existing system –, but it is merely an ancil-
lary positive effect and not the essence of the 
system. instead of the flawed, samuelsonian 
philosophy that is failing before our eyes, 
the foundation should be a fair settlement 
between generations [Banyár’s work (2014) 
and (2016) contains a more detailed analysis 
of this proposal which should be developed 
further].
summary
in my opinion, social security financing and 
the rate of services provided by social security 
and eligibility are closely linked, and cannot 
be arbitrarily selected independent of one 
another. Healthcare has fiscalised financing 
for the most part already, and the transition 
to a wholly fiscalised financing scheme can be 
easily justified. Whether this would truly help 
the country remains the subject of further 
investigation, but it certainly merits further 
discussion.
in respect of pension, we must be aware 
that fiscalisation is identical to transition-
ing to a uniform and low-amount basic pen-
sion system available to all citizens; therefore, 
when we speak of fiscalisation, we must also 
speak of the basic pension. i am not entirely 
confident, however, that this system – which 
functions well in Anglo-saxon countries – 
would also work well in Hungary. For my 
part, i would therefore propose the intro-
duction of a pension system based on a set-
tlement between generations; in other words, 
i would gradually reform the current system 
in a way where eligibility for pension would 
not be created through the payment of pen-
sion contributions, but through the rearing 
of contribution-payers, who in turn would 
have to pay contributions which they owe in 
exchange for their rearing. For those who do 
not wish to have children, a recapitalised sub-
pension system should be set up where they 
can set aside the funds saved on child rearing, 
and this would provide their pensions down 
the line.
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